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I.

PROJECT OBJECTIVE:

This project represents one of several important components of
the multi-state/provincial Gulf of Maine Program sponsored by the
provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and the states of Maine,
New Hampshire and Massachusetts.
In short, the purpose was to
examine options available to the Council on the Marine Environment
for pursuing the establishment of more formal recognition of the
Gulf of Maine Initiative.
To this end, the following report is organized into three
major parts.
The first consists of an analysis of the various
structural/institutional options available to the Council; the
second examines relevant United States and Canadian examples; and,
the third offers recommendations based on the various report
findings.
Issues addressed include the following:
What are the
universe of structural and institutional options available to the
Council?
What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of each
approach? What Canadian and U.S. examples can be drawn upon? How
successful has each of the options been in stimulating regional
cooperation? What, if any, role should the U.S. State Department
and Canadian Foreign Ministry play in the process?
Is an
international treaty necessary? What would be the most appropriate
regional compact for the Gulf of Maine region?
What are the
elements of the most appropriate regional compact?
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II.

GULF OF MAINE COUNCIL ACTION PLAN OBJECTIVES:

* To encourage generation of appropriate and timely monitoring
information to environmental and resource managers and the
general public in order to allow both efficient and effective
management action, evaluation, and public awareness of such
action.
* To assist in the reduction of impacts of point source
pollution of the Gulf of Maine.
* To facilitate regional efforts to assure proper disposal of
debris and vessel wastes within the marine environment of the
Gulf.
* To evaluate existing laws and regulations relating to Gulf
natural resources in order to reduce disparities and improve
performance of those laws and regulations.
* To assist in the reduction of impacts of non-point source
pollution on the Gulf of Maine.
* To promote the protection, restoration, and enhancement of
fish and wildlife habitat within the Gulf of Maine region.
* To develop and implement a regional citizens7 education and
participation program with the intent of involving citizens in
local resource management issues.1

1
The Gulf of Maine Action Plan, July 1991. Prepared by the
Gulf of Maine Working Group for the Council on the Marine
Environment, p. 6.
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III.

STRUCTURAL/INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL:

The options chosen for examination in the following section
are the passing of common legislation, creation of a regional
council or task force, interstate compact, federal interstate
compact, regional compact (consisting of all five jurisdictions)
and the passing of an international treaty.
In illustrating
these options, particular attention will be paid to their
individual characteristics, history, usage, strengths and
weaknesses.

a

.

common. Legislation

Although not of a "structural” or "institutional" form per se,
this option is one that can be utilized regardless of which
alternative the Council agrees to undertake. In short, this would
involve comparing and contrasting the pertinent state, provincial
and federal laws in order to pursue the passing of common
legislation.2
The principal strength of this option is that it offers the
opportunity to effectuate regional cooperation by adopting uniform
state,
provincial and federal laws,
thereby mitigating the
potential for conflict in achieving regulatory goals. In addition,
it is something that can be achieved incrementally and continuously
over the life-span of the organization.
Moreover, working toward
passing
common
legislation
does
not
require
any
"formal"
organizational structure other than perhaps a council or commission
charged with collating the necessary legislative data, drafting
proposed legislation, etc. Lastly, to do so conceivably may take
a great deal less time to achieve than forming a regional
interstate compact, for example.
The primary weakness of this effort lies in the potentially
vast differences in Canadian and American environmental laws and
the possible confusion and time loss that may result from
subsequent legislative efforts. For this reason, such an endeavor
should be combined with a more "structural" option in the
furtherance of the Council's objectives.

2
Such a study is already underway pursuant to a contract
between the Maine State Planning Office and the Marine Law
Institute at the University of Maine School of Law in Portland,
Maine.
The study will compare and contrast existing coastal and
marine related laws and regulations adopted by the concerned
states, provinces and the two federal governments. The Marine law
Institute will develop joint findings with the Oceans Institute of
Canada on the major points of coordination, inconsistencies, and
gaps between the statutory responses in the various jurisdictions.
3
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B.

Regional Council or Task Force

This is essentially what is already in place and known as The
Council on the Marine Environment.
Created via the Agreement on
Conservation of the Marine Environment of the Gulf of Maine by the
governors of Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts, and the
premiers of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the Council functions in
many ways similar to the British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task
Force and the St. Croix International Waterway Commission (examined
in this report at pages 16 and 19, respectively). Broadly stated,
the charge of all three groups is to protect, conserve and manage
their respective area resources by conducting research, educating
the community and coordinating regional efforts.
1.

History and Usage:

There is a great deal that can be accomplished with a regional
council or task force.
The role of such an organization can be
either advisory or planning/management or both. The institutional
form has been used in a variety of settings ranging from an issue
specific, advisory and recommendatory role to a permanent, multi
state authority with extensive powers.
2.

Characteristics:

There are four principal characteristics of the council form:
1. it is a formally articulated agreement between two or
more states to address an issue of mutual concern,
2. it represents the creation of a management and
implementation entity,
3. it provides procedures to facilitate the participation
and cooperative decision making of its signatories, and
4.
it has a level of authority which does not invoke the
compact clause of the United States Constitution.3
Regarding the last characteristic, the inherent limit of the
device is that it is vested with very little or most often no
regulatory authority. For this reason, it has generally been used
by
states
in
those
instances
where
a
formal
multi-state
organization, short of a compact agency is sought.

3 This section on characteristics is adapted generally from
Michael Donahue,
Institutional__ Arramejnei&S__ for Great Lakes
Management (MI: Michigan Sea Grant College Program, 1987), p. 136.
[hereinafter DONAHUE].
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3(a).

Strengths:

Because
this
option
is
not
subject
to
Congressional
involvement or approval, it is easily-formed and potentially very
flexible.
It can be created in a variety of ways, including
federal legislation, common state legislation, or an agreement
between governors (and premiers, as in the case at hand).
In
addition, because the federal level is generally uninvolved, the
agency has the freedom to serve a variety of management needs. In
the past, similar groups have proven to be particularly strong when
placed in an advisory and coordinating role.
3(b).

Weaknesses:

Because the arrangement is not "federally-sanctioned," as is
a compact, it is almost always limited to "soft-management"
functions - those that do not interfere with established state or
federal functions. In addition, it is not as legally binding upon
its signatories as a compact and its funding is difficult to
guarantee.
Lastly, without a legally, not just "politically"
binding agreement, the commitment levels of the jurisdictions are
questionable over the life-span of the agency.
For example, the
St. Croix International Waterway Commission's funding problems,
brought on by Maine's rapidly decreasing budget commitment,
threatens the long-term survival of the Commission.4
For this
reason and others, some groups like the British Columbia/States Oil
Spill Task Force have recommended that an interstate (and possibly
international) compact be created in order to ensure the succession
of its objectives.
C.

Interstate Compact
1.

History and Usage:

"The most binding legal instrument to establish formal
cooperation among states is known as the interstate compact or
agreement."5 An interstate compact is essentially a contract or
treaty between states which is sanctioned by the United States
Congress.
The constitutional support for the device is found in
Article I, Section 10, clause 3, which reads that, "No state shall,
without the Consent of Congress...enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State or with a foreign Power."6 Though the
language seems relatively clear, it is so brief as to leave
important questions unanswered, namely those regarding why and how
4

This is discussed in greater detail at p. 21.

5
Interstate Compacts 1783-1977__ LA Be.vised Compilation.)
(Chicago:
The Council of State Governments, 1977), p. vii.
6

U.S. Constit., Art. I, sec. 10, Cl. 3.
5

compacts are created.7 As a result, the rise of the interstate
compact has largely been a process of trial and error for the
states.
In the early history of the United States, the compact device
was most often used by neighboring states to settle boundary
disputes.
By 1930, however, compacts were being advanced for
different purposes.
For example, of the approximately eighteen
compacts formed during the 1920's and 1930's, one was directed at
the control and reduction of pollution in New York Harbor (the TriState Pollution Compact, ratified by the states of Connecticut, New
Jersey and New York), and another was created for the purpose of
establishing park and recreational systems in New York and New
Jersey (the Palisades Interstate Park Agreement).*
* From 1940 to
the mid 1970's, well over 100 compacts were created, thereby
utilizing the device with more frequency and variety than ever
before.
During this time period, compacts were enacted in such
areas as fisheries conservation, land and water resources, forest
fire protection, mining practices, corrections, taxation, nuclear
energy, educational facilities, civil defense, mass transit, health
services and facilities, economic growth research, waste disposal,
and flood control.9
2.

Characteristics:

As characterized by Zimmermann and Wendell, the interstate
compact has the following six distinguishing characteristics:
1.

It is formal and contractual.

2.
It is an agreement between the states themselves,
similar in content, form, and wording to an international
treaty, and usually embodied in state law in an identifiable
and separate document called the "compact."
3.
It is enacted in substantially identical words by the
legislature of each compacting state.
4. At least in certain cases, consent of Congress must be
obtained; in all cases, Congress may forbid the compact by
Frederick L. Zimmermann and M. Wendell, The Interstate
Compact Since 1925 (Chicago:
The Council of State Governments,
1951), p. 30. [hereinafter ZIMMERMANN].
*
Kevin J. Heron, "The Interstate Compact in Transition:
From
Cooperative
State
Action
to
Congressionally
Coerced
Agreements," St. John's Law Review. Volume 60, Fall 1985, Number 1,
pp. 7-8.
9

Ibid., pp. 8-9.
6

specific enactment.
5.
It can be enforced by suit in the Supreme Court of the
United States if necessary.
6.

It takes precedence over an ordinary state statute.10

3(a). Strengths:
As a fully accepted and effective instrument of interstate
cooperation, the compact device offers the following strengths:
1.
It is a tried, proven, legally binding and enforceable
device which supercedes state law for the collective good
of the compacting states.
As such, it provides a degree of
stability and continuity which is often lacking in other
forms of agreement.
2. The interstate compact language generally provides for a
Commission consisting of representatives from each of the
signatory parties, which will be charged with the
coordination and implementation of the compact's goals.
3. Use of the compact is extremely flexible and can be
quite powerful;
its development is limited only by the
ability of its signatory parties to secure Congressional
ratification.
In theory, it has the capability to vest an
interstate compact commission with broad management
authority and regulatory power.
4. The device generally treats all of the signatories as
equals, thereby encouraging the continued goodwill among the
jurisdictions.
5. Altering or amending the compact generally requires the
unanimous consent of its parties, again serving to
facilitate an ongoing cooperative relationship between
them.11 It should be noted, however, that the amendment
process can be a long and unpredictable exercise that
requires a minimum of 2 to 5 years to complete.
For this
reason, many would consider it a compact weakness.
3(b).

Weaknesses:

Weaknesses of the device generally stem not from its
characteristics, but from the political environment surrounding its
proposed use and operation. Perhaps the most daunting of obstacles
10

ZIMMERMANN, p. 42.

11

DONAHUE, p. 128.
7

is the length of time it can take to ratify a compact.
For
example, the second Hoover Commission determined that an average of
eight years and nine months was required to complete the compacting
process for those proposals which were able to survive all other
necessary steps.
"The attendant investment of time and political
energy is substantial, and in some instances, might be better
expended on alternate institutional arrangements."12
Because the success of the compact is so related to the
political environment at the state, federal and Congressional
levels, the often necessary compromises may leave the device
considerably weaker than originally intended.
If the concessions
are not made, ratification of the compact may be interminably
delayed.
Other criticisms of the compact include instances where the
autonomous commissions formed by compact language have become
politically unresponsive to their respective state constituencies
and where some compacts/commissions have become ineffective,
thereby resulting in another unnecessary layer of government.13
D.

Federal Interstate Compact

Such a compact, in this instance, would consist of Maine, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts and a federal representative.
In every
way, except the federal participation, this type of compact is
identical to the interstate compact in terms of characteristics,
creation, operation and potential powers. The role of the federal
member can vary from non-voting, observatory status to full-member
voting privileges.
In this case scenario, potential federal members might include
representative(s ) from the Environmental Protection Agency, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Department of the Interior and the United States
Coast Guard, to name a few.
The obvious strength of such an arrangement is that, by
allowing for federal participation, the potential for conflict is
mitigated, thereby accelerating the ratifying process.
What
essentially happens in such a case is that federal and state laws
pertinent to the compact merge to further the compact's objectives.
Although still experimental, one example of where this device has
been used successfully can be seen with the Delaware River Basin
12

Ibid., p. 128.

13 James P. Hill, "The Great Lakes Quasi Compact: An Emerging
Paradigm For Regional Governance of U.S. Water Resources?" Detroit
College of Law Review. Volume 1989, Spring, Issue 1, p. 9.
[hereinafter HILL].
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Compact.
In addition to those weaknesses listed for the interstate
compact, the principal weakness relevant to this option is that
while the federal level is included, the international one (the two
Canadian provinces) is not.
Thus, some variation of this device
would be required to yield the "ideal" institutional form for the
Council on the Marine Environment. Again, it is important to note
that the inclusion of a federal member is not a tried and true
form, but rather still very experimental.
The fact that the
federal government acquiesced to membership in the Delaware River
Basin Compact does not guarantee that it will sanction this role in
other situations.
E.

Regional Compact (states and provinces)

This type of compact would consist of all five member
jurisdictions of the Council on the Marine Environment.
Largely
due to the ambiguity of the compact clause and the seeming
reluctance of Congress to endorse such an arrangement, there are
very few binational compacts in existence.
Nevertheless, it has
precedence and is viewed as a legitimate institutional option for
consideration. Like the federal interstate compact, this variation
has the same basic strengths and weaknesses of the interstate
compact.
The point of departure from both the federal and the
interstate compacts comes with the binational nature of this third
type.
Strengths associated with this option include the following:
1. The device succeeds in addressing a region-specific
concern which has perhaps been ineffectively addressed at
the federal level.
2. The full, voting membership status of the two Canadian
provinces secures a stronger commitment to the agency's
goals than would another institutional form.
3. Binational funding of the compact-created management
entity would be available in the compacting language.
Although admittedly a very attractive option for the Council,
it is important to realize that the international compact is even
more replete with legal and political obstacles than the previous
two compact types.
The limited history of the device suggests
heavy opposition from both federal levels and a general reluctance
of states to enter into such "contracts" with foreign entities.
The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact (discussed in
detail at pp. 24-26), created in 1949 and joined by Quebec and New
Brunswick in 1970, is recognized as the first binational compact.
Although there are now a few more of these compacts in existence,
9

they address such uncontroversial issues as the building of a
bridge
(the Buffalo-Port Erie Public Bridge Authority)
and
construction of an international access highway (Minnesota-Manitoba
Highway Agreement).
To date, the Northeastern Forest Fire
Protection Compact is the only one which concerns a natural
resource of broad significance.14* Given this background, Marian
Ridgeway asserts that,
It is therefore clear that under rather limited
circumstances an international agreement of the
interstate compact type can be enacted and can function
successfully.
It is also probable that compacts on
broader economic and social substantive matters
involving international relations will not obtain
support from the United States Department of State,
unless (and this can by no means as yet be construed as
applying to all cases) the international matters and
actions which result shall be required to clear through
the Department of State, which reserves the right to
reject them.16
F.

International Treaty
1.

History and Usage:

The international treaty is a formal binational agreement
which compares favorably with other types of institutional forms
due to its binational nature, degree of formality and demonstrated
success.16 The most potent international legal device available
to two nations wishing to address a common concern, the treaty has
long been used by countries in their common dealings.
The power to make a treaty is given expressly to the
President, but ratification is made contingent upon the advice and
consent of the Senate.
Similarly, the ratification process in
Canada requires approval of the Prime Minister with the advice and
consent of the Parliament.17 An often cited example of the treaty
14
This section on the history of the binational compact
device is derived from Marian C. Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts - A
Question of Federalism (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern
Illinois University Press,
1971),
pp.
155-156.
[hereinafter
RIDGEWAY].
16
Ibid., p. 156.
Reference is made to the ratification
problems encountered by the Great Lakes Basin Compact.
For more
detailed analysis, see pp. 11-15.
DONAHUE, p. 143.
17

Ibid., p. 143.
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device is the "Treaty between the United States and Great Britain
Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions between the United States
and Canada” (commonly known as the Boundary Waters Treaty). Signed
in 1909, this treaty created the International Joint Commission
(IJC) and accorded it a variety of "quasi-judicial, investigative
and surveillance/coordination functions.1,18
2(a). Strengths:
As a binational agreement negotiated and signed by the two
executive branches, the treaty has a distinct legal stature in the
international community.
Although, unlike a compact, the treaty
affords very little enforcement power, it creates the incentive for
continued cooperation by virtue of its binational roots.
Not
surprisingly, treaties tend to be stable and enduring arrangements.
Similar to the compact, the treaty is capable of creating an
implementation or management body charged with overseeing the
objectives of the treaty.
2(b). Weaknesses:
Because they involve the federal level, treaties are subject
to many of the same problems encountered by the binational compact.
Namely, treaties are established rarely and typically after
laborious effort and lengthy negotiations.
In addition, the
likelihood of ratification of a treaty depends not only upon the
political climate surrounding the issues at stake and the relations
between the two countries, but the climate in Washington as well.
Most notably, treaty relations between the U.S. and Canada
suffered a setback, when in 1980, the Senate failed to ratify a
treaty for joint management of East Coast fisheries. Although the
treaty had been signed by the two governments 18 months before, it
became stuck in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee due to the
opposition of some New England senators. As Michael Glennon notes,
"the hand that signs is not the hand that delivers; what looks like
a good bargain to diplomats at the negotiating table may look
altogether
different to legislators
in the
cold light of
constituents' mail.,,x*
In order to avoid this situation, the
Council would have to secure commitment to its objectives from all
relevant governmental levels.

18 Ibid., p. 144.
The IJC has played a very important role
in the Great Lakes region, and although a valuable example for
further research, its jurisdiction does not extend to include ocean
waters.
19 Michael Glennon, "The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification,"
American Journal of International L a w . April, 1983, pp. 257-258.
11
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IV.

CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES EXAMPLES TO DRAW UPON

The purpose of the following section is to analyze several
existing institutional organizations with the thought that one may
serve as a potential role model for the Council. To that end, the
Great Lakes Commission, British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task
Force, St. Croix International Waterway Commission, Northwest Power
Planning Council and Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Council
have been chosen as examples based on their particular relevance to
the objectives of the Gulf Council.
A.
1.

The Great Lakes

Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:

There are several groups at work in this region.
larger and more well-known ones are as follows:

Some of the

The International Joint Commission
Although not strictly a Great Lakes organization, the IJC does
a great deal of its work in this region.
Established by
Canada and the United States under the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909, it has jurisdiction over all water which flows
between the U.S. and Canada.

The Great Lakes Commission
Created by interstate compact in 1955, the Commission is made
up of representatives from the eight Great Lakes States
(Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin). Its purpose is to guide, protect
and advance the common interests of the eight member states.
The Center for the Great Lakes
Founded
in 1983,
the Center
is a private,
nonprofit
organization committed to serving the needs of the Great Lakes
decision makers.
The Center played a key role in laying the
groundwork for the Great Lakes Protection Fund.
The Council of Great Lakes Governors
Established in 1983, this group of the eight state governors
has recorded such achievements as the Great Lakes Charter, the
Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement and the Great
Lakes Protection Fund.
The Great Lakes Protection Fund
Created in 1989, the Fund consists of a $100 million
endowment, initially realized by contributions from the eight
Great Lakes states.
The purpose of the Fund is to support
those state and regional projects dedicated to controlling
12

toxics in the region.20*
Because it represents the most "formalized" group in the Great
Lakes region, the Great Lakes Commission will generally be the
basis for the following discussion.
As referenced above, the Commission was created by interstate
compact in 1955.
It was ratified by Congress in 1968 under the
name of the Great Lakes Basin Compact.
Currently, the Commission
consists of 35 Commissioners - state officials, legislators and
appointees from all eight of the states' governors.
Article I of
the compact identified its mandate as:
1.

To promote the orderly, integrated, and comprehensive
development, use, and conservation of the water resources
of the Great Lakes Basin (hereinafter called the Basin).

2.

To plan for the welfare and development of the water
resources of the Basin as a whole as well as for those
portions of the Basin which may have problems of special
concern.

3.

To make it possible for the states of the Basin and their
people to derive the maximum benefit from utilization of
public works, in the form of navigational aids or otherwise,
which may exist or which may be constructed from time to
time.

4.

To advise in securing and maintaining a proper balance among
industrial, commercial, agricultural, water supply,
residential, recreational, and other legitimate uses of the
water resources of the Basin.

5.

To establish and maintain an intergovernmental agency to the
end that the purposes of this compact may be accomplished
more effectively.

2(a).

Strengths:

In his lengthy study of the various existing institutions for
Great Lakes management,
Michael
Donahue
lists two of the
Commission's primary strengths as having legal authority under the
Great Lakes Basin Compact and the ability to address a broad range

20 This section is derived from information found in Craig
Freshley's report entitled, "Funding the Gulf of Maine Program,"
prepared for the Finance Network of the Gulf of Maine Council on
the Marine Environment, January 1991, p. 73.
For a more detailed
study of the various Great Lakes organizations, see pp. 67-94 of
that report, [hereinafter FRESHLEY].
13
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of economic development and environmental issues.21 However, as
James Hill notes, and Donahue agrees, "most studies, including a
major survey of the attitudes of key Great Lakes decision makers,
conclude that the existing Great Lakes compact is inadequate both
as a regional management body and as an effective device for
deterring federal intervention in the region's water control
decisions."22
For this reason, a closer look at the inherent
weaknesses of the compact/commission is warranted.
2(b).

Weaknesses:

Based on extensive interviews and in-depth study, Donahue's
laundry list of Commission weaknesses include the following:
limited mandate and absence of implementation authority?
inadequate Canadian representation; limited state interest
and support? inconsistent/inadequate state involvement and
leadership? unclear direction at state and staff levels?
lack of follow-through and impact? inability to achieve
consensus; low public profile and level of support? singular
focus on issues? poor caliber or inappropriate selection of
Commissioners? and staffing/funding inadequacies.23
Similarly, Hill sums up the Commission's primary deficiency as
"the lack of political will on the part of the Great Lakes states
to invest the necessary economic and political resources in these
institutions necessary for resolving regional problems removed from
their borders."24
Moreover, because of its "soft" management
authority to conduct only research, coordinate activities, advise
on and advocate issues, no singular authority is left in charge of
the region as a whole.256
2
3.

Funding:

Article VII of the Commission's bylaws provide that "all
component states shall share equally in the expenses of the
Commission.1,26 According to Donahue, contributions by the states
amount to approximately two-thirds of the Commission's total
budget, with the remaining two-thirds coming from various grants,
21

DONAHUE, pp. 230-231.

22

HILL, p. 1 1

23

DONAHUE, p. 231.

24

HILL, p. 1 2 .

25

Ibid., pp. 13-14.

26

Great Lakes Commission Bylaws, Article VII.

.
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contracts and interest on investments.27
4.

Role of State Dept./External Affairs:

This heading would more appropriately be titled, "role of
Congress," as the courts and Congress have consistently limited the
power of the Commission to those "soft" management functions
referenced above.
What is most interesting to note is that
ratification of the compact, weakened as it was, still took
Congress 13 years, and that was only after the role of the
provinces was virtually extinguished.
According to Marian
Ridgeway, the entire consent question was inextricably entangled
with the international question raised by the compact.29
In drafting the compact so as to include the Canadian
provinces, the language of Article II, Paragraph B read:
The Province of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, or
either of them, may become states party to this compact
by taking such action as their laws and the laws of the
Government of Canada may prescribe for adherence
thereto.
As Donahue notes, this language was the "focal point of contention
by the U.S. Departments of State and Justice, both of whom were
wary of usurpation of their authority in relations with a foreign
power."29 When Congress finally approved the compact in 1968, it
included in Article IX an additional section which excluded the
language of Article II, Paragraph B from consent because it
".. .purport[s] to authorize recommendations to, or cooperation with
any foreign or international governments, political subdivisions,
agencies or bodies."
Nevertheless,
as
detailed
interesting developments may be
relationship of the Great Lakes
government.
5.

in the
next
section,
some
on the horizon regarding the
efforts vis-a-vis the federal

The Evolving Quasi-Compact:

Because the region is the largest source of fresh water in
North America and consequently affects at least eight states and
two provinces, it provides an excellent example for the purposes of
this study. Efforts in the region have been marked by a flurry of
different players and by consistent court decisions asserting the
FRESHLEY, p. 83.
RIDGEWAY, p. 157.
39

DONAHUE, p. 134.
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primacy of Congress in regulating the area's resources.30
Having examined the problems associated with the Great Lakes
Basin Compact, the increasing need to find creative ways of making
the compact device more effective is apparent.31
According to
James Hill, the Council of Great Lakes Governors (COGS) has emerged
as a "quasi compact," and a potentially very powerful actor in the
region.
As stated previously, this group of the eight state governors
was established in 1983.
Briefly, its purpose was to "foster
cooperation on environmental and economic policy issues common to
its eight member states."32 The articles of incorporation detail
a much more broad and ambitious charge, yet one that is still
lacking in any regulatory power or authority.
"Yet its high
profile, political membership and organizational structure had
unique
characteristics
that
made
it
an
ideal
choice
for
spearheading efforts to improve regional governance in the Great
Lakes basin."33
Hill asserts that COGS went through a series of steps taken in
a "compact-like process" that have established it as a quasi
compact. First, it negotiated an agreement on common issues to be
resolved on a joint basis (the Great Lakes Charter, signed in 1985
by COGS members, as well as the governors of New York and
Pennsylvania and the premiers of Ontario and Quebec).
COGS then
pledged to initiate state enabling legislation in implementing the
Charter.
The final step involved obtaining the "consent" of
Congress which came with an amendment to a general water resources
authorization bill enacted by Congress - a very unorthodox way, to
be sure.
In short, the amendment transferred the Congressional
power to prevent the diversion of Great Lakes water to the
governors of the Great Lakes states.34 The passing of this federal
authority to COGS, though not creating a formal, traditional
compact, gave it a new, previously undefined status.
Hill
concludes that this new role may have profound implications for the
future of the region.
If it is possible, an institutional fusing
of COGS and the Great Lakes Commission may be the short-term answer
to a long-term problem.
30

HILL, p. 1.

31

Ibid., p. 3.

32 From a brochure published by the Council entitled, "Council
of Great Lakes Governors - Great Lakes - Great Future."
33

HILL, p. 15.

34 For a more detailed discussion of how this occurred, see
HILL, pp. 14-21.
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B.

British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task Force

1. Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:
The British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task Force was formed in
1989 by Alaska,
Washington,
Oregon,
California and British
Columbia. The original objectives of the Force - to jointly study,
share information and develop recommendations on reducing the
threat of oil spills on the West coast - were organized in response
to the devastating Nestucca and Exxon Valdez oil spills.
Operation of the Task Force was initiated by an "Oil Spill
Memorandum of Co-operation" initially signed on June 16, 1989 by
Washington and British Columbia. Shortly thereafter, the remaining
U.S.
states signed on.
The Memorandum dealt with future
transboundary environment and wildlife issues and stressed the
following:
* enhancing the environment and protecting it from oil
spills;
* protecting transboundary fish and wildlife from damage
caused by spills and other discharges of oil?
* maintaining and improving a coordinated response to oil
spills; and
* pursuing the above in cooperation with the federal
governments of Canada and the United States.
Under the memorandum, each jurisdiction agreed to appoint a
representative to the task force, which would ultimately be
charged with the following tasks:
*

creation of a joint emergency response plan?

* evaluation of capabilities and technologies for spill
prevention, response and containment;
* review of tanker safety, routing and operating
requirements ?*
* inventory of equipment, material, personnel and other
resources available to either the province or the states for
use in oil spill control and clean-up operations? and
*

joint spill response drills and training.

Four subcommittees - Prevention Alternatives, Emergency Response,
Financial Recovery and Technology Sharing - were established in
pursuit of these goals.
17
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The memorandum states that its duration is "intended to be
perpetual," but that each party may terminate upon written notice
to the others.35
2(a).

Strengths:

Many of the Task Force's recommendations have already been
carried out.
The five jurisdictions have conducted joint drills,
shared information, coordinated their response efforts and prepared
similar oil spill prevention legislation.36
In addition, all
members of the Task Force now have citizens' advisory groups
charged with monitoring oil spill contingency planning in those
states.37
In view of these accomplishments, the primary strength of the
Task Force appears to be the continuing high level of commitment
among its signatories.
2(b).

Weaknesses:

Some critics have complained that the oil spill prevention
legislation prompted by the report of the States/British Columbia
Task Force has a big bark and no bite.
Referring to Washington
House Bill 1027, one critic "warned that provisions of the bill
'are so weak that we will get all the rhetoric but no action.'"38
The complaint is perhaps symptomatic of a larger problem
befalling the efforts of the Task Force.
As with many similar
entities, this one has no regulatory authority.
In response, the
Task Force, along with two other bodies, has endorsed the creation
of an interstate and possibly international compact (one which
would include British Columbia) charged with having the regulatory
power necessary to prevent oil spills.
3.

Funding:

No formal budget was allocated to the Task Force.
Under the
Memorandum, members were directed to share costs associated with

35 Final Report of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task
Force, October 1990, pp. 15-17. [hereinafter REPORT].
36

Ibid., pp. 18-19.

37 "B.C. Forms Citizens' Spill Panel," Platt's Oilqram Ne w s .
3 May 1991, vol. 69, No. 86, p. 4.
38
Jon Savelle, "Oil-Spill Prevention Proposed —
Critics
Complain Drafts Are All Rhetoric But No Action," The Seattle Times.
24 February 1991, p. B2.
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meetings and reports.39
4-

Role of State Dept./External Affairs:

The Task Force, not being a legal or administrative entity,
functions according to existing state, provincial and federal laws
and therefore has not been of concern to the federal level. With
regard to the compact effort, no clear role has yet emerged.
5.

An Emerging Pacific Ocean Resources Compact:

The Memorandum creating the Task Force is clear to state that
the "parties do not intend by this Memorandum to create any
separate legal or administrative entity."3
4
90 This notwithstanding,
in consultation with two interstate bodies, the Pacific Fisheries
Task Force and the Ocean Resources Committee of the Council of
State Government's Western Conference, the Task Force has endorsed
the creation of an interstate compact which would also include
Hawaii with Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California.
In
addition, the province of British Columbia could join the group,
either as a non-voting member, or, if Congress and the Canadian
federal government approved, as a full member.41
Legislation for the compact has now been introduced in all of
the states (see Appendix A for a copy of the pertinent California
bill).
In essence, the compact would "have the authority to
establish uniform safety standards for routes, crews and equipment
for vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances up and down
the west coast."42
Because the compact would provide uniform
standards in the region rather than five different sets of state
laws, the oil and shipping companies have responded favorably.
Nonetheless, even if all five states adopt the legislation,
congressional approval of the compact remains uncertain.
"The
compact's area includes portions of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans

39

REPORT, p. 17.

40 Oil Spill Memorandum of Co-operation Between the Province
of British Columbia, the State of Washington, the State of Oregon,
the State of Alaska and the State of California, June 1989.
41 Don Byron, "Pacific Ocean Compact: Bill Aims at Increasing
State Influence,"
Alaska Journal of Commerce. 18 February 1991,
vol. 13, No. 7, sec. 1, p. 1.
42
Ethan Rarick, "Western States to Consider Uniform Oil
Shipping Rules," Proprietary to the United Press International, 31
January 1991, BC cycle.
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bordering the states within the 200-mile exclusive economic
zone."43
State Senator Bill Bradbury, sponsor of the Oregon
compact bill, has said that congressional approval depends on
keeping the support of the oil and shipping industries.445
4

C.
1.

St. Croix International Water^ Y

rnimnission

Structure/Participants/Objectives:

"Though this water body is minute compared to the Gulf of
Maine,
the
Commission
serves
as
an
excellent
example
of
international cooperation for the purposes of protecting the
vitality of a water body, in the interests of both Americans and
Canadians.
Furthermore, it is an agreement between a U.S. state
and a Canadian province; the federal governments are not directly
involved.1,45
The
impetus
for the
St.
Croix
International
Waterway
Commission was created by a Memorandum of Understanding signed in
1986 by New Brunswick and Maine.
Enabling legislation for the
Commission was passed in both jurisdictions in 1987.
There are
eight members of the Commission who are appointed equally by New
Brunswick and Maine and serve on a voluntary basis for two years.
The objectives of the Commission, as stated in the 1986 Memorandum
are as follows:
a) protect and manage an increasingly valuable natural and
recreational resource for current and future usage;
b) encourage and maintain a high quality back country
recreational and educational experience for users of the
resource;
c) encourage tourism, based on identified themes, with
resultant economic benefits to the region;
d) protect and promote awareness of human heritage
resources including both Indian and early European;
e) ensure coordination in the planning and management of a
shared resource;
43
"Five Pacific Ocean States Working Toward Offshore Oil
Transportation Plan," The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Daily
Report for Executives. 27 February 1991, p. A-3.
44

Ibid.

45

FRESHLEY, p. 115.
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f) establish the mechanisms and processes to be used to
ensure fair representation of all user groups thereby
minimizing conflicts? and
g) obtain optimal benefits from recreational and
educational use of the resource while recognizing the
historic and current economic importance of the forest
resource including its management and commercial
utilization.4
4
*6
The Commission's 1988-1989 Annual Report identifies its mission as:
”To ensure cooperative, comprehensive management of the
St. Croix International Waterway's natural, historical
and recreational resources to provide maximum long term
benefits - in environmental, cultural and economic
terms - to the people who live in or visit the St.
Croix region.”47*
2(a).

Strengths:

Since the Commission began full operation in January of
1989, it has seen several accomplishments.
Within a year, the
Commission was able to obtain and integrate Canadian and American
information on the river into a database for use as a management
tool.
The Commission has also created a common map of the region
and a shared library consisting of over 500 volumes.
Most
notable is an action or management plan drafted by the
commission, which names long-term legislative and environmental
goals for the region and is anticipated to succeed in both
legislatures in late fall of 1991.
Lee Sochasky, Executive Director of the Commission,
identifies the fact that the Commission is viewed as the "river's
advocate,” and not as belonging to any one interest as its
greatest strength.44 As a result, Sochasky stated that the
Commission has been able to work successfully with corporations
and other sometimes hard-to-reach groups.

44 Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Maine of
the United States and the Province of New Brunswick of Canada
Regarding the St. Croix International Waterway, 17 November 1986.
[hereinafter MEMORANDUM].
47 St. Croix International Waterway Commission, Annual Report
1988-1989, p. 5.
44 Telephone interview with Lee Sochasky, Executive Director,
St. Croix International Waterway Commission, 16 July 1991.
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2(b).

Weaknesses:

The two primary weaknesses of the Commission are that it has
no regulatory power and that its funding is unstable.
The first
weakness has not presented a major problem thus far, probably due
to the success that the Commission has had in dealing with the
various groups (landowners, government agencies, industry, etc.).
The second weakness, however, does place the Commission in
jeopardy.
As Lee Sochasky put it, because the Commission was
created via a memorandum of understanding and not something more
permanent, it "could be eliminated tomorrow." As things stand
now, due to the well-known budget problems in Maine, the Maine
state government cut the Commission's budget from $50,000 in 1990
to $10,000 in 1991. Although New Brunswick has still committed
to giving $50,000, the Commission funds will only carry it
through October, 1991.
3.

Funding:

The Commission is funded primarily by the governments of
Maine and New Brunswick.
The 1986 Memorandum of Understanding
provides that, "the State of Maine and the Province of New
Brunswick shall share the costs of developing and managing the
St. Croix International Waterway.”4* The Commission is also
able to accept funds from other sources including federal
agencies, private corporations and individuals.
To this end, the
Commission has charitable status in both Canada and the United
States.
Given the recent developments with the decrease in
Maine's financial commitment, this status may prove to be crucial
to the long-term survival of the Commission.
4.

Role of State Dept./External Affairs:

Since the Commission has not challenged or dealt directly
with any federal jurisdiction matters, it has not had any contact
with the State Department.
However, regarding both federal
levels of government, it is provided in the Memorandum that,
"representatives of the Governments of the United States and
Canada will be invited as observers by the Governor of Maine and
the Premier of New Brunswick,” but that those representatives
"shall not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum.”4
5
90

49

MEMORANDUM.

50

Ibid.
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D.
1.

Northwest Power Planning Council

Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:

Currently, there are only two interstate compacts which are
able to exert authority over federal agencies.
The power to do
so must first be explicitly assented to by Congress.51* One is
the Northwest Power Planning Council and the other is the
Columbia River Gorge Commission.
Of the two, the Northwest Power
Council is considered to the "the more powerful multi-state
compact. 1,52
Through the Northwest Power Act of 1980 (PL 96-501), the
United States Congress authorized the states of Idaho, Montana,
Washington and Oregon to enter into an interstate compact,
thereby creating the Northwest Power Planning Council.
The
Council consists of eight members - two appointed by each of the
four state governors.
Under the Act, Congress assigned the
Council the following three duties:
1. Develop a 20-year electrical power plan that will
guarantee adequate and reliable energy at the lowest cost to
the Northwest.
2.
Develop a program to protect and rebuild the fish and
wildlife populations in the Columbia River Basin that have
been affected by hydroelectric development.
3.
Conduct an extensive program to involve the public in
the Council's decision-making processes.
As such, the Council is a "policy-making" entity.
The primary
agencies that work under the Council to implement its power plan
and
fish
and wildlife
programs
are
the
Bonneville
Power
Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
The
Council also works with various utilities, environmental groups,
state and local governments, fish and wildlife agencies, Indian
tribes and others who are involved in energy, fish and wildlife

51
This authority was challenged and upheld in Seattle Master
Builders v. Pacific Northwest Power.and Conservation Council. 786
F.2d. 1359, 1364 (1986).
82 Harry Bader, "Potential Utility of an Interstate Compact
as a Vehicle for Oil Spill Prevention and Response," SPILL - The
Wreck of the Exxon Valdez. Appendix M, University of Alaska Sea
Grant Legal Research Team, 1989, p. 5.
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issues.53
2(a).

Strengths:

The primary strength of the Council is, without a doubt, its
policy-making and influencing capacity.
The most specific
acknowledgment of the Council's strength is Section 6(c) of the
Northwest Power Act which requires Bonneville to submit any major
acquisition (anything over 500 megawatts and of five-years'
duration) to the Council for review.
If the Council does not find
the acquisition consistent with its power plan or fish and wildlife
programs, it may refuse the acquisition. Bonneville's only remedy
then is to go to the U.S. Congress.545 In short, this is a case in
which the federal government has allowed its' agencies to be bound
by a non-federal agency.
Fortunately for the Council, another strength has been the
generally favorable relationship it has shared with Bonneville.
"By the time [James] Jura took office as Bonneville Administrator,
both agencies had begun to pay less attention to defining their
turfs, and began working together toward shared objectives....
Today, I would characterize the relationship between the Council
and Bonneville as a very strong, cooperative and productive working
relationship.,,ss
2(b).

Weaknesses:

Despite the authority of the Council vis-a-vis the various
federal agencies, it is often still forced to go to Congress to
achieve its objectives.
For example, one of the biggest problems
addressed in the Council's fish and wildlife program has been high
fish mortality caused by
the turbines of the dams and altered
river flows.
To mitigate this, the Council has sought to put in
place permanent bypass systems at each dam. To do so, however, it
must work with the Army Corps of Engineers.
In 1987, 1988 and
again in 1989, the Council had to go to Congress to get the Corps
to fund the much-needed installation of bypass systems.
As Tom
Trulove, Chairman of the Council, noted, "so far, Congress has
responded, but it has taken a lot of regional resources, and,
53 This information on the structure and objectives of the
Council has been derived from a pamphlet entitled, "Northwest Power
Planning Council."
54 Remarks Before the Oregon Chapter Federal Bar Association
by Tom Trulove, Chairman, Northwest Power Planning Council, 21
December 1989, p. 4.
55

Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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frankly, the Corps' foot-dragging on this issue has set back the
schedule for installing screens.”56
3.

Funding:

The Council is funded by Bonneville Power Administration rate
revenues, but in no way is part of Bonneville.57 The Council's
budget for Fiscal Year 1991 was $7,616,000.58
4.

Role of State Dept./External Affairs:

Not applicable
Council.

E.
1.

as

there

is

no

foreign

contingent

to

the

Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission

Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:

The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission was created
in 1949 by interstate compact. Besides being the first forest fire
protection compact, it was the first to authorize participation
outside the United States, by adjacent Provinces in Canada.5* Its
original members were Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island (in 1950), and Vermont.
The
Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec became full members
in 1970.
Article I of the compact asserts its purpose as, ”To
promote effective prevention and control of forest fires in the
northeastern region of the United States and adjacent areas in
Canada.”60 Article IV lists its duties as the following:
(1)

(a)

To study method and practice, etc., for bringing about
prevention and control of forest fires.

(b)

To coordinate the forest fire plans and work of the

56

Ibid., p. 15.

57

Ibid., p. 1.

58
p. 38.

Northwest Power Planning Council, 1990 Annual Report,

3* w<phe Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission - What
it is and how it operates," p. B-l.
60

Ibid., p. B-2.
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several states.
(c)

to facilitate the sending of aid.

(2)

Formulate and revise a regional forest fire plan to serve
as a common fire plan for the region.

(3)

Recommend to the several Governors and State Legislatures
measures to promote the purpose of the compact.

(4)

Consult and advise with administrative agencies of the
states regarding fire control problems and recommend the
adoption of appropriate regulations.

(5)

Recommend to the states any and all measures which will
effectuate the prevention and control of forest fires.612
6

The Commission consists of 27 Commissioners - three from each
of the states and provinces.
The appointed Commissioners and
various forest fire personnel meet periodically for mutual
direction, training, experience, and information exchange.62
2(a).

Strengths:

The greatest strength of the Commission according to its
Executive
Director,
Richard
Mullavey,
is
that
it
is
"institutionalized."
In other words, because it was created by
interstate compact, it has avoided the financial and other pitfalls
common to groups like the St. Croix International Waterway
Commission.63 In addition, its longevity (since 1949) establishes
it as one of the oldest, still-active compacts.
2(b).

Weaknesses:

With regard to its unambiguous and narrow objective, the
Commission has genuinely succeeded and is indeed a very good
example of an effective compact/commission.
Mullavey's only
complaint (if it can be referred to as such) is that there are not

61

Ibid., p. B-3.

62 Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission, 1990 Annual
Report.
63
Telephone interview with Richard Mullavey, Executive
Director, Northeastern Forest Fire Commission, 23 July 1991.
The
address for the Commission is 10 Ladybug Lane, Concord, N.H.
03301; telephone (603) 224-6966.
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enough catastrophes
stuff.”64
3.

for

the

Commission

to

really

"strut

its

Funding:

With a budget of only $28,000 for fiscal year 1991, funding is
hardly a problem for any budget.
Still, the system that the
Commission has in place is both interesting and unique in that onehalf of the budget is divided up among the nine jurisdictions
according to their total acreage in the compact area.
The member
assessments range all the way from 0.9% contribution in Rhode
Island (512 protected acres) to 29.1% in Maine (17,743 protected
acres).65 The other half of the budget is divided equally among
all nine states and provinces.
Thus, the funding for the
Commission is derived almost entirely from the budgets of the
states and provinces, with the exception of an occasional federal
grant.
4.

Role of State Dept./External Affairs:

The two federal levels have expressed little or no concern
regarding the Commission since Article XIII of the compact states
that it does not limit the powers of the states (vis-a-vis the
provinces) nor affect cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service.667
6
Moreover, the straightforward nature of the Commission's objective
- to prevent and control forest fires - is instrumental in
garnering support form all governmental levels.
As Mullavey put
it, "fire doesn't respect any boundaries - international or
otherwise.1,67

64

Ibid.

65
Operations Manual for the Northeastern
Protection Commission, July 1990, p. 17.

Forest

Fire

66 "The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission - What
it is and how it operates," p. B-l.
67

Telephone interview, 23 July 1991.
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V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As demonstrated in this report, there are a number of
institutional forms and examples for the Council on the Marine
Environment to follow.68 What is most important to bear in mind
is that, "form should follow function."
That is, whatever the
Council decides its function to be, so it effectively chooses the
form it must take.
Thus far, the Council has chosen a "soft-management" course
(see Council objectives, p. 1). The Council has also demonstrated
its desire to remain a five jurisdiction group; more specifically,
to ensure the continued full participation of the Canadian
provinces.
As long as the Council remains on this path, the form
that it utilizes now is sufficient.
If, however, the Council
should decide to pursue a more authoritative and perhaps regulatory
position in the region, it must consider a different approach.
It has been demonstrated that the presence of an international
entity - in this case, a Canadian province - almost immediately
secures the attention of the U.S. State Department.
To be sure,
there are a great many obstacles in the way of maintaining full
Canadian membership. For this reason, the Council might seriously
consider remaining in the position it holds today and adopting a
wait-and-see approach as to how powerful a regional player it may
become.
Should, however, the Council think it may want some
regulatory power in the future, it may very well want to start now
the process of assessing and garnering political support.
After examining the various institutional forms available to
the Council, perhaps the most appropriate (and again, only if the
Council wants the regulatory power potentially secured by this
method) choice would be a combination of the federal interstate
compact and the regional compact? that is, a compact consisting of
the five jurisdictions plus a federal member. Although this would
likely take a great deal of time and negotiation, the presence of
the federal level(s) at the outset might serve to mitigate likely
ratification problems.69

68 For a more detailed discussion of these and other forms,
see the DONAHUE book.
It can be ordered from the Michigan Sea
Grant College Program by calling their publications office at
(313) 764-1138.
69
As noted in Chapter II,
Section
organizations which might be approached include
Protection
Agency,
the
National
Oceanic
Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Interior and the United States Coast Guard.
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D, some federal
the Environmental
and
Atmospheric
Department of the

This option is slightly preferable to a treaty in that the
five compacting jurisdictions are already united and working toward
their common objectives.
Bringing in the federal levels at this
point, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty broad enough to
allow for a regulatory commission, would likely delay the Council's
goals and take potentially just as long to ratify as a compact. In
other words, since the federal levels have been uninvolved to date,
it might be best for it to stay that way. In so doing, the Council
members are able to maintain their positions as the principal
negotiators and spokespersons rather than forfeit that role to the
executive branches.
If it appeared that such a compact would not be ratified, and
the Council still wanted to be a regulatory power, it might choose
to create an interstate compact consisting of Maine, New Hampshire
and Massachusetts with a Canadian equivalent. Although this would
likely weaken the relationship between the five jurisdictions, it
would be one way to secure an authoritative position for the
Council's goals in the region.
In any event, the deciding factor in the Council's choice for
its future comes down to whether it desires a governing role in the
region, similar to that of the Northwest Power Planning Council or
a "softer,” advisory and coordinating role as with the St. Croix
International Waterway Commission. Given the commendable progress
and cohesiveness already characteristic of the Council, the
opportunity certainly exists for it to forge its own path in
becoming an important regional entity.
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THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
BILL TEXT
STATENET
Copyright (c) 1991 by Information for Public Affairs, Inc.
CALIFORNIA 1991-92 REGULAR SESSION
ASSEMBLY BILL 393
1991 CA A.B. 393
VERSION: Introduced
DATE-INTRO: January 31, 1991
SYNOPSIS:
An act to add Division 21.5 (commencing with Section 31500) to the Public
Resources Code, relating to coastal resources.
DIGEST:
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 393, as introduced, Hauser.

Pacific Ocean Resources Compact.

Under existing law, the Administrator for Oil Spill Response is vested with
specified powers and duties concerning prevention, removal, abatement, response,
containment, and cleanup of oil spills in marine waters of the state.
This bill would ratify the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact containing
specified provisions for the regulation of the transportation of oil or
hazardous substances on offshore waters and specified related matters. The
compact would take effect after one or more of the States of Alaska, Hawaii,
Oregon, or Washington ratify the compact and consent is granted by Congress.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. State-mandated
local program: no.
TEXT: The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Division 21.5 (commencing with Section 31500) is added to the
Public Resources Code, to read:
DIVISION 21.5.

PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT

31500.
(a) The Legislature of the State of California hereby ratifies the
Pacific Ocean Resources Compact as set forth in Section 31501. The compact
shall take effect after one or more of the States of Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, or
Washington ratify the compact and consent is granted by Congress as required by
Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States.
(b) In addition to the States of Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, the
Province of British Columbia may become an associate party to the compact,
without voting power. Upon request of the Province of British Columbia and
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approval of Congress, the Province of British Columbia may become a full party
to this compact with the same rights and powers as the party states.
31501.
follows:

The provisions of the
Article 1.

Pacific Ocean Resources Compact

are as

Findings and Purpose

(a) The parties recognize the following:
(1) The States of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington and the
Province of British Columbia have a common interest in the protection of marine
and coastal resources. This common interest results from the following:
(A) The fluid, dynamic ocean currents and atmospheric winds that carry
pollutants beyond one party's coastal area to another.
(B) The migratory nature of many important living marine resources that
depend upon the marine habitat of various parties for different parts of their
life cycle.
(C) The economic reliance of each party upon renewable resources of the
ocean.
(D) The use of the ocean for transport of oil and other hazardous substances
between ports in the various parties and other nations.
(E) A regional interest in providing a stable environment for those
communities dependent upon ocean resources and ocean trade for a livelihood.
(2) Some marine resource activities, such as fisheries, are currently highly
managed with regard for their regional or transboundary nature through existing
state programs, regional fisheries councils, interstate compacts, and
international treaties. Because there are existing formal mechanisms for
interstate cooperation and coordination for these marine resource activities,
this compact is not intended to encompass these activities.
(3) A formal interstate agreement does not exist to address and resolve
issues of mutual concern or to coordinate individual programs of the parties
that affect regional interests in the following areas:
(A) Prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills.
(B) Transportation of oil and other hazardous substances.
(C) Oil and hazardous substance spill response plannings.
(D) Environmental monitoring and research.
(4) Each party has jurisdiction over the submerged and submersible lands
within its territorial sea and responsibility for management of many marine
resources and ocean uses. Each party has unique natural resource, social,
economic, and political conditions for which local management by the individual
party is the most appropriate.
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(5) Parties now do not have an effective means to address mutual concerns
related to transport of oil and hazardous substances in waters within and beyond
the party's jurisdiction that may jeopardize ocean resources and uses important
to one or more coastal parties.
(6) The 1983 Presidential Proclamation of the 200-mile United States
Exclusive Economic Zone has created the opportunity for all coastal states to
more fully exercise and assert their responsibilities pertaining to the
protection, conservation, and development of ocean resources under United States
jurisdiction.
(7) Citizens of the Pacific states and the Province of British Columbia are
increasingly concerned with the environmental integrity of the ocean and
protection of all ocean resources.
(8) Recent studies conducted in the wake of major accidental releases of oil
or hazardous substances have concluded that the existing system of response to
spills fails to provide adequate protection to ocean resources in the following
ways:
(A) Inadequate personnel training and qualifications.
(B) Weaknesses in vessel design and integrity.
(C) Insufficient traffic management.
(D) Gaps in regulatory oversight.
(E) Incomplete cost recovery by the states or provinces.
(F) A lack of information about the marine and coastal environments.
(9) A spill or discharge of oil or hazardous substances from an ocean-going
vessel has the potential of causing major regional impacts.
(b) The purposes of this compact are as follows:
(1) To assist in the promotion of interstate commerce by providing uniform
regulation of the transportation of oil or hazardous substances within the
compact zone.
(2) To provide a legal mechanism to regulate certain ocean activities within
the United States Exclusive Economic Zone that the parties cannot now
individually regulate.
(3) To enhance regional sovereignty over issues of critical importance.
(4) To direct federal agencies to act in the best interest of the region.
(5) To foster regional cooperation and pooling of resources to reduce costs
and increase effective use of scarce resources.
(6) To enhance the oversight and supervision of activities of concern to the
parties.
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(7) To address issues of mutual concern to the Pacific states and the
Province of British Columbia and enhance the parties' influence over activities
of concern that are not now addressed through existing compacts, including the
following:
(A) Spill prevention.
(B) Transportation of oil and other hazardous substances.
(C) Spill response planning.
(D) Environmental monitoring and research.
(8) To foster cooperation and coordination among the parties in order to
increase the effectiveness of the individual party's ocean laws and programs.
(9) To provide technical assistance to parties for ocean activities covered
by this compact.
(10) To provide for formal participation by the Province of British Columbia
with the compact to more fully address issues of regional concern.
(11) To ensure that the citizens of the region have opportunities to
participate in discussions and deliberations of regional ocean resources issues
(12) To establish an innovative system under which the parties can represent
their shared interests within the compact zone, including both of the following
(A) The maintenance and protection of common ocean resources.
(B) The vessel transportation of oil and other hazardous substances.
(13) To establish uniform safety standards for routes, crews, and equipment
for vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances within the compact zone
and to provide oversight for the implementation of these standards and
regulations by federal agencies, states, or provinces and private industry.
(14) To promote more coordinated management of ocean resources that are of
mutual concern.
(15) To provide a forum for the regional coordination of the individual
parties' plans for the management and protection of those areas of the Pacific
Ocean and adjacent waters over which the parties jointly or separately now have
or may acquire jurisdiction.
Article 2.

Definitions

As used in this compact unless the context clearly requires a different
meaning:
(a) "Compact" means the representative body created by Article 4.
(b) "Compact zone" means the portion of the oceans bordering the parties
within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
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(c) "Hazardous substance" or "hazardous substances" means any element or
compound that, when it enters in or upon the water, presents an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment,
including, but not limited to, fish, animals, vegetation, or any part of the
natural habitat in which they are found. "Hazardous substance" includes, but is
not limited to, a substance designated under Section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of Title 33
of the United States Code, any element, compound, mixture, solution, or
substance designated under Section 9602 of Title 42 of the United States Code,
any hazardous waste having characteristics identified under or listed under
Section 6921 of Title 42 of the United States Code, any toxic pollutant listed
under Section 1317 (a) of Title 33 of the United States Code, and any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency has taken action under Section 2606 of
Title 15 of the United States Code.
(d) "Navigable waters" means the waters of the United States, including the
territorial sea.
(e) "Oil" means crude petroleum oil and any other hydrocarbons regardless of
gravity, which are produced at the well in liquid form by ordinary production
methods, and any petroleum products or petrochemicals of any kind and in any
form whether crude, refined, or a petroleum by-product, any kind and in any form
whether crude, refined, or a petroleum by-product, including petroleum, fuel
oil, gasoline, lubricating oils, oily sludge, oily refuse, or mixed with other
wastes, liquefied natural gas, or propane.
(f) "Party" means a state or province that ratifies this compact as provided
in Article 3.
(g) "Representative" means an individual appointed as provided in Article 4
to represent a party to the compact.
(h) "Vessel" means a watercraft or other artificial contrivance that is
constructed or adapted to carry, or that carries, oil or hazardous substance in
bulk as cargo or cargo residue, and that does either of the following:
(1) Operates on the navigable waters of the compact zone.
(2) Transfers oil or hazardous substance in a place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
Article 3.
(a) This compact
Alaska, California,
consent of Congress
Constitution of the

Ratification

shall become operative when two or more of the States of
Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington ratify the compact and the
is granted as required by Section 10 of Article I of the
United States.

(b) This agreement shall become operative as to the Province of British
Columbia as a full party upon request of the Province of British Columbia and
approval of the Congress.
Article 4.

Pacific Ocean Resources Compact
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(a) The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact is created and shall have its
offices within the territorial limits of one of the parties, shall carry out its
duties and functions in accordance with this compact, shall continue in force
and effect in accordance with this compact, and, except as specifically provided
in this compact, shall not be considered an agency or instrumentality of the
United States for the purpose of any federal law. Each party participating in
this compact shall appoint three persons, subject to the applicable laws of the
appointing party, to undertake the functions and duties of representatives of
the compact. The compact shall be invested with the powers and duties set forth
in this compact.
(b) The term of each representative shall be four years. A representative
shall hold office until a successor is appointed and qualified, but the
successor's term shall expire four years from the legal date of expiration of
the term of the predecessor. Vacancies occurring in the office of a
representative for any reason or cause shall be filled for the unexpired term by
the party represented by the vacancy. Any party may remove the representative
for that party in accordance with the statutes of that party. Each
representative may delegate to a deputy the power to be present and participate,
including voting, as the representative or substitute, at any meeting of, or
hearing by, or other proceeding of, the compact.
(c) The compact shall invite the Director of the Department of
Transportation, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or
their designees to participate as nonvoting members of the compact.
Article 5.
(a) The
following:

Pacific Ocean Resources Compact

Pacific Ocean Resources Compact

Authority

is authorized to accomplish the

(1) Facilitate the prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills through
the establishment of uniform safety standards for routes, crews, and equipment
for vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances to the extent that the
parties and the federal government have that authority within the compact zone.
(2) Ensure a coordinated network of oil and hazardous substance spill
response plans and programs of the parties, federal agencies, and private
organizations.
(3) By regulation, establish the requirements for submission of, and approval
by, the compact of a contingency plan by any vessel transporting oil or
hazardous substance in the compact zone. The requirements shall be at least as
stringent as the requirements for spill response plans under Section 4202 of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-380). A plan developed in accordance with
the regulations adopted by the compact and approved by the compact shall satisfy
the requirements of Section 4202 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and any
requirements of an individual party for submitting a vessel contingency or spill
response plan. In establishing regulations under this subdivision, the compact
shall work closely with officials of the parties to assure that the vessel
contingency plans required under this compact are at least as comprehensive as
similar plans required by the parties and to integrate, to the fullest extent
possible, any requirements for vessel contingency plans in effect at the time
the compact initiates its requirements under this subdivision.

I
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(4) Establish and maintain an informational clearinghouse related to spill
response, including a directory of personnel, equipment, technical expertise,
organizations, and other resources available to assist as part of a regional oil
or hazardous substance spill response.
(5) Provide a forum for discussion and recommendation to resolve conflicts
among member parties or the federal government regarding various ocean resources
programs that have been or may be established by each party.
(6) Provide opportunities for public participation in compact activities by
holding meetings of the compact in various locations within the territorial
limits of the parties, providing opportunities for public comment at meetings,
and developing a public outreach program.
(7) Designate state or provincial agency officials to act on behalf of the
compact as liaisons with federal agencies.
(8) Identify the regional data needs related to ocean resources and recommend
a method for compiling the data in a format that can be shared by all parties.
(9) Consult with and advise any pertinent party or federal agency with regard
to problems connected with ocean resources management and recommend the adoption
of any rules or regulations the compact considers advisable that are within the
jurisdiction of the agency.
(10) Establish sanctions and a schedule of civil penalties for violations of
the rules or regulations of the compact and impose those sanctions or civil
penalties in accordance with Sections 551 to 559, inclusive, and Sections 701 to
706, inclusive, of Title 5 of the United States Code.
(11) Request the United States Coast Guard to enforce or assist in the
enforcement of any regulations adopted by the compact related to the prevention
of and response to oil or hazardous substance spills in the compact zone.
(b) In addition to the authority granted under subdivision (a), the compact
may do any of the following:
(1) Accept grants and gifts.
(2) Enter into contracts for whose performance the compact shall be solely
responsible in order to support its operations.
(3) Conduct and prepare, independently or in cooperation with others,
studies, investigations, research, and programs relating to the purposes of this
compact.
(4) Conduct public hearings on matters pertaining to the purposes of this
compact.
(5) Issue subpoenas.
(6) In accordance with the provisions of Sections 551 to 559, inclusive, and
Sections 701 to 706, inclusive, of Title 5 of the United States Code, enforce
the rules and regulations adopted by the compact to carry out the authority of
the compact as set forth in this article.
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(7) Appoint technical and advisory committees for the purpose of advising the
compact on regional ocean resources issues, data needs and format, and other
purposes related to the compact's activities. A technical or advisory committee
appointed by the compact shall not be subject to the provisions of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463, as amended).
(8) Allow a variance from the provisions of this compact or rules or
regulations adopted by the compact pursuant to this article. A variance shall be
based on a showing by the person or entity seeking the variance that the
activity allowed under the variance will have no regional impact and that the
variance is economically necessary. Under no circumstances may a variance result
in the regulation of the transportation of oil or hazardous substances according
to standards less stringent than standards imposed under federal law.
(c)
The compact shall adopt all regulations necessary to carry out its duties
and exercise its authority under this article. The compact shall adopt the
regulations in accordance with Sections 500 to 559, inclusive, of Title 5 of the
United States Code.
Article 6.

Pacific Ocean Resources Compact

Organization

The compact shall select a chairperson and a vice chairperson. After the
initial chairperson and vice chairperson are selected, the compact shall
establish a rotation for the selection of the chairperson and vice chairperson
so the office rotates through the parties to this compact. The compact shall
appoint and at its pleasure remove or discharge such officers and employees as
may be required to carry the provisions of this compact into effect and shall
fix and determine their duties, qualifications, and compensation. The compact
shall adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of its business. It may
establish and maintain one or more offices for the transaction of its business
and may meet at any time or place within the territorial limits of the signatory
parties, but shall meet at least once a year.
Article 7.

Voting and Quorum

(a) A majority of the representatives shall constitute a quorum.
(b) Each party shall be entitled to one vote. No action or decision of the
compact shall be approved unless the action or decision receives a majority of
the votes of the parties.
Article 8.

Support Agencies

The compact may contract for the staff support necessary to carry out the
purposes of this compact or request appropriate agencies of the signatory
parties to act as the research agencies of the compact.
Article 9.

Parties' Powers Under Compact

Except as specifically provided in Article 5, nothing in this compact shall
be construed to limit the powers of any party or to repeal or prevent the
enactment of any legislation or the enforcement of any requirement imposing
additional conditions and restrictions to conserve ocean resources..
Article 10.

Absence

a
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Continued absence of representation or of any compact representative from any
party shall be brought to the attention of the appointing authority of the party
not represented.
Article 11.

Funding

(a) Each party shall contribute to the support of the compact according to
the party's relative proportion of the party's gross state product, but each
party shall contribute at least 10 percent of the total annual budget for the
compact, and no party shall be required to contribute more than 50 percent of
the total annual budget for the compact.
(b) The annual contribution of each party shall be figured to the nearest one
hundred dollars ($ 100).
(c) The compact shall prepare an annual budget which shall be approved by
vote of the compact. After approval, the proposed budget shall be presented to
the chief executive and legislative body of each party.
(d) Each party shall be responsible for the expenses of its own
representatives.
Article 12.

Withdrawal From Compact

This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each party until
renounced by it. Renunciation of this compact shall be preceded by sending six
months' notice in writing of intention to withdraw from the compact to the other
parties to the compact.
SPONSOR: ASSEMBLY BILL
No. 393
Introduced by Assembly Member Hauser
(Principal coauthor: Assembly Member Farr)
(Coauthor: Assembly Member Felando)
(Coauthors: Senators Marks and McCorquodale)
January 31, 1991
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